Following Kurdish People’s Leader Abdullah Ocalan’s call on February 27, the Peace and Democratic Society Process began, during which the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) announced its decision to disband and lay down arms. Signalling the transition to the second phase of the process, the Kurdish Freedom Movement declared on October 26 that its forces had withdrawn to the “Media Defence Areas.” With these developments, global experiences in ending armed conflicts have once again become a topic of discussion. Among the most prominent examples is that of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), which recently sat at the negotiating table with the British government.

 

The conflict and negotiation process between the IRA and the British state spanned many years. Beginning in the late 1960s in Northern Ireland, the period known as “The Troubles” evolved into a prolonged internal conflict that claimed tens of thousands of lives. However, the 1998 Good Friday Agreement paved the way for the IRA’s disarmament and for Sinn Féin’s growing role in politics. Despite numerous challenges, the process was shaped around mutual recognition, trust-building, and the will for a political solution.

 

This experience now serves as a significant reference point in the renewed discussions on peace and democratic resolution in Turkey. Indeed, members of the National Solidarity, Brotherhood and Democracy Parliamentary Commission visited Ireland on October 31 to study the Irish process as part of their work on resolving the Kurdish issue.

 

We spoke with sociologist Denis O'Hearn, who has conducted extensive research on Ireland and Kurdish movements. O’Hearn evaluated the historical background of the IRA experience, the core dynamics of peace processes, and the similarities and differences between the PKK and the IRA.

 

 

The evolution of the IRA from an armed struggle to a peace process is widely regarded as a turning point in modern conflict resolution literature. In your view, what were the deepest social and political dynamics behind this transition? Was the motivation for the IRA to disarm primarily a strategic decision, or was it a transformation that emerged from the grassroots?

 

There were two major motivations for a ceasefire from the IRA’s perspective. First was an assessment by some that the armed struggle had reached a stalemate. Key actors in the British military also concluded that they could not defeat the IRA. If so, prolonging armed struggle as a strategy would bring more harm to the communities in the north of Ireland, while bringing them no closer to British withdrawal and movement toward a united socialist republic. Secondly, perhaps more importantly, the Movement’s political party, Sinn Féin, achieved considerable electoral success following the mobilization of the communities to support the 1980-1981 hunger strikes. There was an assessment, which turned out to be true, that shedding the armed image would enable them to gain further popularity among potential supporters: northern Irish nationalists (mostly Catholics) who supported the more mainstream Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and were wary of armed struggle and, especially, the people in the south of Ireland. A “political” strategy – fighting elections while advancing a progressive social agenda on issues such as health, housing, education, and the Irish language – became an important prong in the struggle in a way that was not true before the 1980s. There was hardly unanimous support for a ceasefire within the movement and much of the grassroots favoured a continuation of armed struggle, particularly since there were new developments in the struggle that arguably tilted things in favor of the IRA. Attacks on the financial sector in London and new successes against the occupying British army, especially on the border between the north and south of Ireland, increased optimism in some sectors of the IRA. At the same time, improved international relations with parts of the global south, especially Latin America, emerged. On the other hand, parts of the leadership who favored the peace process were encouraged by support from powerful politicians in the United States, especially in the Democratic Party. There was considerable debate between those who looked toward the global south as partners in struggle and those who were building alliances in the United States.

 

Initially, the British government viewed the IRA solely as a “security issue.” At what point, and for what reasons, did the idea that a political solution was inevitable gain acceptance within the upper echelons of the state? What role did Sinn Féin play in this process?

 

 

The British side was perhaps more split than the Republican side. On one hand, hardline supporters of the Thatcher government held out against any concessions to Irish Republicanism, although their support for the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 that aimed to isolate the IRA backfired. That agreement was meant to solidify the standing of the mainstream nationalist SDLP as a political alternative to IRA/Sinn Féin but increasing political support for Sinn Féin following the hunger strikes made this policy unworkable. By this time, key sections of the British army and security establishment recognized that they could not defeat the IRA. The fall of the Thatcher government in 1990 cleared the way for elements of the British security establishment who favored a peace settlement to hold secret talks with representatives of the IRA.

 

 

During the IRA’s disarmament process, to what extent was the grassroots population convinced? How was public support and trust built during this critical period?

 

 

Among the nationalist population in general, there was a certain “war-weariness” that translated either into support for the ceasefire or lack of enthusiasm for opposing it. Within the movement, probably the biggest obstacle was strong opposition to disarmament, with the idea that neither the British government nor the Unionist state in the north of Ireland could be trusted and, therefore, that arms needed to be retained. British intransigence might mean that war would have to be waged again. And many people felt that the (largely Catholic) nationalist population would require armed defense, as it did when it came under attack in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In a sense, one could argue that the Republican leadership was less successful in building public support and trust than it was in wearing down any effective opposition. Leaders such as Gerry Adams and Martin Maguiness were quite popular and certain oppositional groups (such as the “Real IRA”) made the tactical mistake of splitting from the Movement when many progressive members who were skeptical of the ceasefire still trusted the leadership more than they trusted those who split from the Movement.

 

In Turkey, the Kurdish People’s Leader Abdullah Ocalan called on the PKK to lay down arms, and the organization subsequently disbanded and burned its weapons. In your view, what historical parallels and differences exist between this step and the disarmament process of the IRA?

 

 

There was never a degree of support for disarmament within the Republican Movement that would have enabled the IRA to make such a public display as we saw the PKK make when they burned their weapons on TV. For many Movement members and supporters this would have been viewed as a defeat or a capitulation to the British. Instead, the Irish peace process required a long, hidden process, where a group of international figures who were deemed to be credible to the British and US governments could observe a secret process where the IRA’s arms were “put beyond use” (words like “destroyed” or “handed over” could not be used). The secrecy of the process allowed Republicans to maintain a public myth that they had not capitulated to British and Unionist demands, while British and Unionist supporters of the peace process were able to claim that they had forced the IRA to disarm. In the end, the practicalities of disarmament may have been the most difficult hurdle that both sides had to overcome in the peace process.

 

 

The IRA’s demands centered on political recognition and equal citizenship. The PKK’s demands have evolved since its inception, and currently focus on democratic integration, recognition of identity, and local governance. How do you assess the similarities and differences between the political goals and negotiation strategies of these two movements?

 

 

Since Ocalan and the PKK have moved from the goal of creating a Kurdish state, to the conception of democratic confederalism, the two movements are quite distinct. Sinn Féin’s electoral successes enabled it to move forward toward achieving more electoral representation on the island of Ireland, while combining a moderately progressive left agenda around issues like housing and healthcare. The ultimate goal is still to establish a United Ireland. Recent developments, including the election of a left, republican Irish President, have enhanced optimism that a United Ireland is attainable sooner rather than later. While there have been significant local movements toward local governance and the enhancement of mutual aid organizations, this has never been a central part of Irish Republican strategy, which is still quite state-centered. Thus, a central problem for Sinn Féin has been to encourage and participate in a left-coalition that has the popularity to govern, while at the same time remaining the leaders of that coalition. The Kurdish movement, on the other hand, has the advantage of building practical local governance, without having to “prove itself” by taking national power or winning national elections. At the same time, the democratic forces in Rojava have given real encouragement to progressive forces around the world, much in the same ways as has the Zapatista movement in Chiapas in Mexico. They have done this by increasing real participative democracy at local levels without the challenge of taking state power.

 

Ideological transformation played a key role in the IRA’s peace process, shifting from armed resistance to “political participation.” The PKK, likewise, has emphasized “democratic modernity” and civil politics. In your view, in what ways are the ideological reconstruction processes of these two movements similar, and in what ways do they diverge?

 

I believe the two movements have fundamentally different conceptions of democracy, partly because of Ireland’s position in the European Union. Sinn Fein has maintained a central electoral strategy of seeking state power, whereby they can use the tools of public policy at the national level to attack social issues as well as the issue of Irish unity. While there are also strong elements of local direct democracy, the primary indicator of political success in Ireland is electoral victories at the national level. Ultimately, it will also be necessary to win referendums to create a united Ireland. For some time, as I understand it, the Kurdish Movement has strongly emphasized direct democracy through local autonomy and governance.

 

Both movements faced the state’s “terrorism” discourse. When and under what conditions was the British government able to move beyond this framing? What changes in mindset would need to occur for Turkey to undergo a similar transformation?

 

This is an interesting and complex question. Although some sections of the British polity and security administration tried to maintain the “terrorist” discourse, this became increasingly difficult as the pace process proceeded and especially after the IRA put its arms “beyond use.” Republican leaders like Gerry Adams began appearing on public media and their charisma and common-sense discourse created a public image that was far from “terrorist.” As oppressive as the British government has been in Ireland, they were never able to imprison people because they became “too popular,” as the Turkish government has done with Demirtas or even Imamoglu. Remember, even Bobby Sands won a seat in the British parliament as he was dying on hunger strike. For things to change in Turkey, I believe the government would have to become less authoritarian and to respect the rule of law. Free speech, an open media, and support for human rights would have to become commonplace, whether the government likes it or not. Municipalities must be allowed to govern without interference by the federal government. Ocalan would have to be taken at his word now that he has supported an unarmed strategy and people should be able to hear him speak and see that he has important ideas.

 

Prior to the Good Friday Agreement, prisoner releases, amnesty discussions, and prison reforms were central to the negotiations. How did the state’s evolving approach to prisons affect the Irish peace process? What inspiration might this experience offer regarding political prisoners in Turkey?

 

Prisoner releases were crucial. The whole basis of Sinn Féin political action centered on ex-prisoners, many of whom won elected office or became involved in community organization. IRA volunteers who were “on the run” in the south of Ireland were able to return home and engage in community activities, whether electoral politics or cultural and economic organizations at the grassroots level. The men and women who negotiated the peace agreement and other aspects of the peace process were largely ex-prisoners, some of whom had been convicted of serious acts of guerilla war including bombing campaigns. As they became involved in unarmed political action, whether electorally or at the community level, they moved away from their commitment to armed struggle. Then, over following decades, generations of activists arose who had never been in the armed struggle or imprisoned. Still, these younger activists were inspired by the generation of activists who had given so much for their ideals. I taught a class in Turkey where we (the students and I) corresponded with Kurdish political prisoners in F-type prisons. From these interactions, and from speaking to Kurdish ex-prisoners, I am aware that they can play an important role in bringing younger people into political struggle and community organization. Of course, in Turkey many political prisoners are not there because they engaged in armed struggle but simply because they have opposed the state. It seems like it will take a lot for the Turkish state to release political prisoners because it views them as a political threat. But this is a necessary step for real peace to come about. 

 

One of the most fragile aspects of peace processes is “trust-building.” How was trust established during the IRA process? What role did mutual oversight, mediators, and international observers play? How do you assess the potential applicability of such mechanisms in the Turkish context?

 

For supporters of the IRA, the Irish peace process required a lot of trust building, but it was mostly about trust of their leadership by the rank and file. I don’t think many Irish people will ever trust a British government. Frankly, there were large sections of the Movement who did not support disarming and who felt either that some level of armed “victory” (for lack of a better word) was possible or that lack of trust in the British state and the police meant that the IRA had to maintain some defensive capability. The importance of internal discussions within the IRA was huge and the army leadership built enough trust among the rank-and-file through these discussions that they were able to win support, even though there was a lot of grumbling among IRA volunteers and supporters who “went along with” the majority decision. Mediators and international observers lent some confidence on the nationalist, or Republican side, although many inherently mistrusted US politicians. I believe their main function was to build trust in the peace process among British and Unionist (roughly, “Protestant”) leaders. US observers like former Senator George Mitchell (chair of the peace talks) bolstered confidence among some Republicans and people like Canadian General John de Chastelain (head of the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning) reassured Unionists and the British that disarmament was real. All of this led to large majority votes in support of the Belfast or Good Friday Agreement of 1998, after which opposition to the peace process was fairly marginal on either side.

 

In your book “Nothing but an Unfinished Song: Bobby Sands, the Irish Hunger Striker Who Ignited a Generation”, you portrayed the resistance of the hunger-striking political prisoner Bobby Sands not merely as an individual act, but as a collective transformation of political consciousness. Considering the current situation of political prisoners in Turkey, particularly Abdullah Ocalan, could prisons serve as a space for political reconstruction?

 

I think they already have served this role, especially given the huge influence of Ocalan in building a new analysis of participative democracy involving local autonomy and governance and, especially, women’s participation at all levels. Given his isolation on Imrali, his ability to reflect on Turkish and Kurdish realities and to build a new analysis of participative democracy is amazing, possibly even unprecedented in world history. On my limited observations of the situation in Turkey, and in the context of Ocalan’s writings, I believe a crucial step is for the Kurdish people and especially women activists to build confidence in their own abilities to lead and to take up Ocalan’s invitation to build the institutions of democratic confederalism. Of course, Ocalan must be released but Kurdish activists must build confidence in their own ability to self-govern.

 

In Ireland, peace was achieved not only between the state and the IRA, but also through the construction of a culture of reconciliation among communities. In Turkey, a negative mindset has long been cultivated against the PKK and Abdullah Ocalan. In this context, do you think that achieving lasting peace requires only “state transformation,” or must a broader “societal consensus” also be established?

 

Clearly a broader societal consensus must be established. Remember, the British and Irish states, as well as the loyalist community, built a negative discourse about the IRA, about Gerry Adams and others. They made terrible jokes about Bobby Sands and the hunger strikers. Yet I remember receiving a letter from an elderly Protestant man, a unionist, who told me that he read my biography of Bobby Sands and the Irish prisoners. He had always considered them to be mindless terrorists, but after reading about what they did he understood their courage and why they did what they did. Changing minds is hard work, and gains can quickly be reversed. I’ve watched two things happen in the north of Ireland. First, prisoners who were once at war with each other have come together under the peace process and created joint community projects. They have begun to build trust in each other. And second, the generation of my daughters have begun to think differently, to make friends on all sides of the community. And look at how many Turkish attitudes toward Greeks and Armenians have changed. Yes, it is hard work, but it must be done, and all sides must work at it. As for the state, it must recognize the legitimacy of all cultures and languages.

 

Looking at international experiences, what would you identify as the most important lessons Turkey can learn from the Irish peace process? Do you consider peace merely as an agreement, or as a broader process of societal reconstruction?

 

 

 

 

For some people, peace is defined simply as the absence of armed conflict. If that is all there is to peace, then its worth is limited. For others, and I believe this is true of the Republican Movement in Ireland, peace had to be a route toward social change. Not only a move away from the injustices that were built into society by British colonialism and occupation. As long as the British occupied a part of Ireland there was no real hope for any effective challenge to the injustices that are inherent in capitalism. That said, the question remains about the effective route to a just society. Here, I think there are two, possibly contradictory strategies. One is to engage in electoral politics at the national level, in the hopes of gaining state power and transforming society from above. We can see from history that this has never fully worked. In revolutionary instances, even the most idealist and progressive forces tend to get caught up in enforcing new rules and regulations that threaten freedom. In the absence of revolution, the electoral path tends to end up in a seesaw where progressive forces win for a while and try to create good policies in areas such as healthcare, housing, and food security, and then rightist forces win subsequent elections and reverse the modest gains that progressive forces have tried to create. This has been true not just in Europe but also in Latin America. In Ireland, progress toward Irish unity as well as social welfare has been almost glacially slow and uncertain. The other route is to build participative democracy from below. Building strong communities with institutions of self-governance that promote social participation and welfare and build local confidence in people’s ability to self-govern. I believe this is absolutely necessary if meaningful societal change is to happen. But one question is whether the Turkish state will allow communities to build this kind of autonomy and democracy. Thus, although the Kurdish Movement has turned away from the goal of taking state power through the construction of a Kurdish state, the question remains about whether one can create local democracy in the context of a heavily authoritarian Turkish state. Perhaps the peace process will help in this regard if, turning back to the question of the state’s “terrorism” discourse, it can lead to a progressive backing off of the Turkish state’s security apparatus, thus creating spaces for local democracy to emerge and take hold.

 

Finally, having conducted extensive research on both the IRA and prison policies, which historical lessons do you think need to be recalled today to address the Kurdish issue in Turkey?

 

Prisons, especially political prisons, are highly contradictory institutions. On one hand, they are deeply unjust. Isolated imprisonment in particular – such as in the H-Blocks in the north of Ireland, supermax prisons in the United States, or F-types in Turkey – are among the most severe violations of human rights in the world today. On the other hand, political prisons are a crucible in which highly motivated and intelligent social activists and revolutionary strategies are often formed. Ex-prisoners, therefore, can be a great source of leadership. They can return to their communities and build the kinds of participative institutions that are necessary for real lasting societal change to happen. Self-organized ex-prisoner organizations can be very effective promoters of direct democracy in communities. They lead by example. On the other hand, prisoners emerge from prisons as traumatized individuals. We must recognize this and help build support institutions through which they can readjust and deal with the effects of their trauma. Thus, while the release of prisoners is an indispensable part of any peace process, their communities must prepare to help them in the very difficult process of returning to life.