NEWS CENTER - Russian-born Israeli journalist Alexandra Appelberg stated that Erdogan may want Til Rifat in return for Idlib. Referring to the relationship between Erdogan and the Putin administration, Appelberg said Russia is likely to negotiate an option for more limited operation.
Proxy wars continue in Iraq and Syria. Regional dynamics and international powers both "solve" and create problems. There is complete vicious circle. Pragmatism is an obstacle for the autochthonous peoples living in these lands to build their own future. Kurds, one of these peoples, are decisively involved in the construction of the future despite all the obstacles. However, while ants are building a nest, there are those who fill this nest with straw. The increasing threats to the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria in recent days reflect this disruptive mood. We interviewed journalist Alexandra Appelberg from Israel-based Detaly about the current atmosphere in both Iraq and Syria:
As known, Turkey recently has been conducting military operations against Kurdish elements in Iraq. Last year it also carried out kind of forays in the Syrian lands such as Efrîn, Girê Sipî, Serêkanîye, controlled by the AANES (Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria). How do you assess this aggressive policy?
It also has an important role in distracting people at home from their domestic grievances, such as economic crisis, the decline of democracy, the diplomatic problems with the United States and NATO state
Erdogan is trying to present himself as a regional player, and his operations across the border, be it in Iraq or Syria, certainly serve this purpose. Especially in Syria, he wants to be a person who should be at the table where any negotiations about the future of the state are taking place. It also certainly is an element in his ongoing offense against the Kurds, specifically the PKK and their allies, or whoever Erdogan sees as their allies. It also has an important role in distracting people at home from their domestic grievances, such as economic crisis, the decline of democracy, the diplomatic problems with the United States and NATO states (even though these across-the-border gambles might be the source of many of the problems at home). For Erdogan’s hardcore nationalistic base most of it looks like a strong leader is taking care of the nation, despite the adversaries in the West. It is a classical playbook of authoritarian leaders, we can see the same type of behavior, let’s say, in Russia.
It is asserted that the KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party) allies with Turkish troops. What does the KDP try to make? What sort of policy do you think has been adopted by the KRG (Kurdistan Regional Government)?
I guess it comes as no surprise if you consider the past relationships between Barzani and Turkey – specifically, in the 1990s, the rift occurred between KDP and PUK, and Turkey supported KDP against PUK who allied with PKK. I think it’s part of what is called the “realpolitik”: once you have a certain power, you do everything to hold on to it, even if it includes some compromises. For Barzani, it is beneficial to have a powerful ally in Turkey. For Turkey, it is important to be able to rely on somebody across the border in their campaign against the PKK.
According to the current events such as approval of the war bill, Erdogan’s administration is preparing to attack the Shahba region or Kobanê. Is that possible? Is there any threat similar to Efrîn?
Erdogan may want to trade Idlib for Tal Rifaat in order to have this bargaining chip that he can use both with Russia and the US.
It is certainly possible, although nobody can say for sure at this point. On one hand, it feels unreasonable, as the military operation would further worsen the relationship with the US and might turn out to be a costly project in times of economic instability in Turkey. However, this might be a way for Erdogan to project his power both as a regional actor and for his audience at home. It is understood that Vladimir Putin is probably pressuring Erdogan to step aside from the Idlib area and let the Assad regime regain control there. Erdogan may want to trade Idlib for Tal Rifaat in order to have this bargaining chip that he can use both with Russia and the US.
How do you see the possibility of Russia and the USA supporting Turkey? Will they really allow Turkish troops?
Russia will probably negotiate and approve some sort of limited operation in Syria. Erdogan and Putin have a long history of collaboration, clashes and compromises in Syria specifically, but also in Libya, South Caucasus and other conflicts, so they will find a way to work together. As for the US, any Turkish operation in Syria will be at the displeasure of Washington and clash with the American interests. However, if Erdogan moves forward with this plan, I don't think there is much Washington can do except for condemnation. As valuable as the United States is for Turkey, Turkey is also very important for the US and NATO, and maybe even more as a buffer state for Syrian refugees, that keeps them away from Europe. This connection won’t be broken over the Kurds. At the same time, it does not mean that Erdogan can do whatever he wants in Syria. He still needs to maintain the balance between Russia and the US, which has been the main objective and strategy in his foreign policy for a while.
In Syria, negotiations for a new constitution apparently began but after a short time they shut down. What do you expect in the new constitution? Do you see any transition to federative system? Will the new constitution bring the Kurds a status?
I don't want to speculate, but maybe the recent re-start of negotiations regarding the constitution show some attempts to move forward, and we will see more of it. However, these negotiations once again ended up with nothing.
As these negotiations once again lead nowhere, I don’t think we will see any significant change any time soon. However, in some sense there is a shift regarding the situation in Syria. It looked like some western countries who previously insisted on regime change in Syria and did not want to negotiate with Assad, changed their opinion and became more open. The US agreed to supply fuel to Lebanon through the territory of Syria. Jordan hosted some Syrian officials in Amman, and King Abdulla even had a phone call with Bashar Al-Assad, the first time in a decade, – which, I suppose, could only happen with some sort of approval from the US. Other countries in the region (UAE, KSA, Egypt) have also shown some willingness to re-integrate Syria, partly to limit the influence of Iran. And it is also in the interests of Russia to find a political solution to this diplomatic stalemate. I don't want to speculate, but maybe the recent re-start of negotiations regarding the constitution show some attempts to move forward, and we will see more of it. However, these negotiations once again ended up with nothing. So I would say that at this point there is no indication that we will see any favorable outcome for the Kurds any time soon, unfortunately.
As much as I follow that you live in Israel. I would like to get informed of what Israeli government thinks about AANES?
I don’t think Israel has a clear policy towards AANES or any Kurdish entities for that matter. We’ve been through a period of political instability, and the current government is mostly focused on immediate issues. However, I believe there is a great potential for the development of Israeli-Kurdish relations. As a long-time “people without the land”, Jewish Israelis must be sympathetic to Kurdish people’s desire for autonomy and statehood. The two peoples also have shared experiences of discrimination from other forces in the region, including Sunni Muslims/Arabs. All that being said, I think the biggest obstacle to the creation of the relationships between Israelis and the Kurds is the right-wing, ultra-nationalistic turn that Israeli politics took in recent decades. I hope eventually we will be able to mutually recognize the benefits of ties that can connect our people.
MA / Ismet Konak